The summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping garnered even more than the usual fanfare, in part because Chinese AI memes of the summit spread like wildfire. The interpretation of the summit’s outcomes, as usual, differed in each capital. Much of the commentary on the U.S. side predictably saw the summit as a “nothing burger” because few concrete deliverables emerged. But the Chinese side, unsurprisingly, portrayed the meeting as a “historic reset” in the bilateral relationship.

That this asymmetry persists is largely because of the two countries’ different objectives and political cultures. The American side typically wants immediate and specific outcomes because winning the news cycle matters as much politically as it does in getting actual wins. The Chinese side doesn’t have to win any news cycles, for obvious reasons. So Beijing always prioritizes setting the tone and agreeing on a framework, after which the aperture for negotiations and outcomes widen considerably.   

The reality, as one Chinese interlocutor once quipped to me, is “never as bad as your media claims and never as good as our media says.” That is a good heuristic for reflecting on what transpired and what it means. With some distance from the summit, I think it is useful to focus on the few things that surprised me and to highlight a structural dynamic that will materially determine how the U.S.-China relationship moves forward.

Three Surprises

Expectations were low heading into the summit, and exceeding a very low bar isn’t hard. Still, a few surprises have been underappreciated and could well shape the U.S.-China relationship going forward.

For one, Xi’s treatment of Trump appeared above and beyond in some respects. If Trump’s goal was to strengthen his personal rapport with Xi Jinping and entrench the “principal-to-principal” model in managing the U.S.-China relationship, then he seems to have accomplished that. And Xi demonstrated a willingness to reciprocate.

Beyond the optics and pageantry, the one-on-one time at the Zhongnanhai gardens (the leadership compound where Xi lives and works) is underappreciated as a rare and meaningful gesture on Xi’s part. Trump clearly recognized it, but more than that, Xi was demonstrating that the two leaders can come together in private to talk candidly and deal with problems.

Building on that candor, the second surprise was Xi’s agreement to a reciprocal visit to Washington, currently scheduled in September.

Trump has invited Xi to Washington before but did not get a positive and immediate response. Whether or not Xi’s September visit was worked out beforehand, the immediate agreement suggests that this summit was simply the first act of a longer play that will unravel over the course of 2026. Xi would not be keen to come to the White House and leave empty-handed, particularly heading into his fourth term, implying he believes something more substantive will be forged between now and September.

And third, Trump unexpectedly accepted China’s new framework for the relationship. U.S. and Chinese summit readouts can often seem like they came from two separate meetings, as each side dwells on what matters to their domestic constituencies. But there was a key through line in the respective readouts this time: Both sides agreed to some version of Beijing’s proposed “constructive strategic stability” framework.

Each side’s interpretation of what, exactly, it means likely differs. But accepting such a framework in the first place is significant, as doing so is often politically fraught on the U.S. side. This seems to have Trump’s imprimatur all over it, and it is likely that his acceptance of the framework gave Xi the green light to immediately accept the invite to Washington.  

A New Structural Dynamic

So what does all of this amount to? The “deal” that was made in Beijing wasn’t aircraft, chips, or soybeans; it was about decisively moving to an approach that will determine the relationship through the end of Trump’s term: a principal-to-principal model, where the  buck stops with each leader on major decisions regarding the relationship. Trump and Xi set the table for the next three years, and the main courses on the menu are trade, technology, and Taiwan.

A number of the smaller issues will be dealt with through the new boards on trade and investment, essentially a revived dialogue mechanism to address specific issues and to maintain working-level relationships. But the most sensitive and intractable problems will likely be sorted out between the two principals.

Such a model has long been advocated by some on both sides. On balance, it can have a stabilizing effect because the two leaders are the anchors. When previous anchors of the relationship—trade flows, people flows, capital flows—have all withered, this personalized anchor may be the best shot at preventing two very large vessels from unnecessarily colliding.

It also comes with downsides and risks, of course. For example, such a model will only play to Trump’s tendency to freelance and to be persuaded by the last person he talks to—certain to unnerve his advisers on combustible issues like Taiwan.  

More importantly, the extent to which this structure holds now depends heavily on the respective political strengths of Trump and Xi, which can keep domestic politics from derailing this fragile agreement. The main, near-term risks to this dynamic, then, will be the 2026 U.S. midterm elections and China’s 2027 political transition—the two occasions that can upend the political environment necessary to sustain a leadership-driven detente.

The risk is clearly higher on the U.S. side given Trump’s political vulnerabilities, particularly when it comes to the Iran war. But this also leads to an uneasy logic: A politically strong Trump is necessary for Xi to operationalize the principal-to-principal model. The longer the Iran conflict persists, the more likely Trump will come out of the midterms weaker.

The biggest surprise, then, may be that Beijing and Washington find alignment on Iran not because of energy and geopolitics, but because swiftly resolving the conflict has significant implications for ensuring U.S.-China stability. As Beijing is often fond of messaging, each side should strive to not let supposedly small matters get in the way and derail the big picture of U.S.-China relations.